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RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
JOINT VENTURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative agreements between companies are becoming an in-
creasingly attractive means of developing and commercializing intellec-
tual property. This is particularly true in high-technology industries
because the costs and risks of all stages of producing and marketing a
product entail unique concerns.' While many of the risks inherent in
high-technology businesses can be reduced by forming joint ventures,
2
at least one added risk is encountered: the risk of violating antitrust
laws. Currently, legislators, economists, and legal scholars debate the
chilling effect that federal antitrust laws may have on a company's deci-
sion of whether to form a joint venture.
3
Antitrust policies have been in a state of flux for the last fifteen
1. See, e.g., Jorde & Teece, Antitrust and International Competitiveness: Acceptable Coopera-
tion Among Competitors in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 A'TrrrusT L.J. 529,
530-40 (1989).
2. There are a variety of ways to define a '"joint venture." For purposes of this dis-
cussion, I have adopted the description provided in Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1982). There, the author characterizes a joint venture as:
[A]n integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the
following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of
the parent firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent makes a
substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the enterprise exists as a busi-
ness entity separate from its parents; and (4) thejoint venture creates significant
new enterprise capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a
new product, or entry into a new market. (citations omitted)
Id. at 1526.
Cooperative arrangements other than formal joint ventures would share many of
these same antitrust concerns. In Porter & Fuller, Coalitions and Global Strategy, in CoMPETr-
TION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 315 (M. Porter ed. 1986), the authors prefer the use of the
term "coalition" to describe "formal, long-term alliances between firms that link aspects of
their businesses but fall short of a merger. They include joint ventures, licensing agree-
ments, supply agreements, marketing agreements, and a variety of other arrangements."
"Intellectual property joint ventures" are those cooperative arrangements in which
companies are developing or commercializing technology which is subject to protection
under intellectual property law. Probably the most common examples are research and
development or high technology production joint ventures.
3. See, e.g., Blechman, Use of Joint Ventures to Foster U.S. Competitiveness in International
Markets, 53 AsrrTRuST L.J. 65, 66 (1984) (arguing that the cost of litigation alone would be
enough to prevent business executives from pursuing research joint ventures); Starling,
Trade Deficit and Legislative Surplus: The New Joint Venture Legislation, 58 A nTRusT LJ. 671,
684 (1989) (arguing that proposed legislation may "be more relevant to the perceptions of
business planners than to antitrust realities"); American Stock Exchange Conference Speaker,
Fed. News Serv. (Fed. Info. Sys. Corp.) (Commerce & Trade Section, Oct. 15, 1990) (com-
ments of Attorney General Dick Thornburgh supporting passage of joint production ven-
ture legislation); CBO Finds Problems With Easing Law for Large Joint Production Ventures,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 59, No. 1477, at 174 (Aug. 2, 1990) (Congres-
sional Budget Office study discusses both sides of issue); Scholars, Industry Witnesses Dispute
Need For Joint Venture Legislation, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 59, No. 1475, at
72 (July 19, 1990) (academicians and industry representatives debate need for additional
legislation); Antitrust Limit Voted By House, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, D, at col. 6 (late ed.)
(broad support for proposed joint production venture legislation).
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years. For example, between 1975 and 1981, the Department ofJustice
completely reversed its position regarding the per se illegality of many
patent licensing practices. What were once considered to be per se viola-
tions are now treated under rule of reason analyses. 4 In the 1970s and
1980s, the courts also displayed a trend toward using a rule of reason
analysis in cases involving joint ventures whenever there might be a
chance of procompetitive benefits. 5
Congressional actions have also had an impact. In 1984, Congress
passed the National Cooperative Research Act 6 (NCRA), which essen-
tially codified the rule of reason approach with respect to research and
development joint ventures. Additionally, several bills proposed during
recent sessions of Congress have suggested that rule of reason analysis
also be applied to production efforts. 7 Recently, one of those bills was
passed by the House of Representatives. 8 H.R. 4611 requires that rule
of reason analysis be applied to joint ventures. However, distribution,
marketing and sales joint ventures are still exposed to full antitrust
liability.9
4. Compare Law on Lzcensing Practices: Myth or Reality?, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) No. 213, at A-9, 10 (Jan. 30, 1975) (comments of then Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Bruce Wilson announcing the Department ofJustice's "Nine No-No's of Patent
Licensing," licensing acts which the Department of Justice would consider to be per se
illegal) with Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 A'rrrrausT
LJ. 515 (1981) (comments of then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Abbot B. Lipsky,Jr.
individually burying each of the "nine no-no's"). It has been suggested that "Mr. Lipsky
... came close to transforming the Nine No-No's into the Nine Yes-Yes's." Ewing, Technol-
ogy Transfers Under U.S. Antitrust Law: A Private View, 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 13, 25
(1982).
5. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985) (member's expulsion from buying cooperative not a boycott where
reason for expulsion was failure of member to follow rules necessary to maintain effective
functioning of cooperative); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
U.S. 1 (1979) (alleged price-fixing characterized as a marketing arrangement reasonably
necessary to effectuate rights of members); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical restrictions may have procompetitive effects).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1984).
7. See, e.g., S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S5395-96 (daily ed. May
16, 1989) (statement by Mr. Leahy) (a straightforward extension of the NCRA to include
joint "manufacturing and processing of equipment and materials"); H.R. 2264, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H1812 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (amending the NCRA by
striking the term "joint research and development venture" each place it appears and in-
serting in lieu thereof "joint research, development, or production venture"); S. 952,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 13 CONG. REC. S5039-40 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (designed to
provide protection specifically for joint ventures involved in the research, design, develop-
ment or manufacture of HDTV technology); H.R. 1025, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REc. H277 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of Mr. Edwards) (an amendment to the
NCRA with regard to joint ventures entered into for the purpose of producing, marketing
or distributing a product, process, or service); H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. E425-26 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of Mr. Boucher) (extending the
NCRA to include production joint ventures following a formal certification process); H.R.
423, 10 1st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E4 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989) (statement of Mr.
Wyden) (notification providing limited damages and rule of reason standards and defining
its coverage of "flexible manufacturing networks" to include joint production, marketing
and distribution efforts).
8. H.R. 4611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990)
(statement of Mr. Brooks).
9. Id at H3103 (comments of Rep. Moorhead). See also infra notes 84-89 and accom-
panying text.
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These legislative measures are intended to encourage the formation
of socially beneficial joint ventures. However, the guarantee of rule of
reason analysis may be of little solace to potential joint venturers so long
as the courts, with their limited business savvy, are given free reign to
determine what is "reasonable." Until legislation is enacted which bet-
ter defines the acceptable structure and behavior of a joint venture, one
must carefully consider the treatment that a challenged effort might re-
ceive under a court's rule of reason analysis. This note first reviews the
approach historically applied by the courts in rule of reason analyses. It
then addresses the social, commercial and legislative considerations
which uniquely affect rule of reason analysis for an intellectual property
joint venture.
II. ANALYSIS By THE COURTS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act' 0 provides that every contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. " As is apparent from
this broad language, courts were given little direction as to the enforce-
ment guidelines to be applied. Therefore, in the early stages of antitrust
jurisprudence courts developed two general approaches when evaluat-
ing an alleged violation: per se and rule of reason. 12 A practice is a per se
violation of the antitrust laws if the agreement or act is of such an an-
ticompetitive nature that it is inconceivable that there could be any off-
setting procompetitive benefits. If, however, a plausible argument can
be made that there are also social benefits to be gained from the an-
ticompetitive practice, then the courts are expected to apply rule of rea-
son analysis.
The rule of reason approach has been stated in many different ways.
The Supreme Court, however, has settled on one general test: "whether
the challenged contracts or acts 'were unreasonably restrictive of com-
petitive conditions.' 13 Obviously, this test is only marginally more
helpful than the phrasing of the Sherman Act itself. Nevertheless, be-
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
13. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911)). See also F.T.C. v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[w]hether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition")); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) ("[T]he essential inquiry... [is] whether or
not the challenged restraint enhances competition. Under the Sherman Act, the criterion
to be used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition.");
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 26 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (whether "the challenged policy [has] a significant adverse impact on competi-
tion"); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Under this
rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restric-
tive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.").
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cause courts have applied this standard in enough cases, it is possible to
distinguish acceptable practices from those which are unacceptable.
In essence, the Supreme Court standard is a balancing test which
weighs the relevant anticompetitive and procompetitive elements of a
challenged activity. Factors on the anticompetitive side include refusals
to compete, 14 withholding information needed to make cost-based buy-
ing decisions, 15 concerted limitations of service to customers, 16 reduc-
tion of output, 17 price fixing,18 boycotts,' 9 and restrictions beyond
those necessary to meet the acceptable goals.
20
The most frequently cited procompetitive factors generally involve
the creation of various efficiencies in the marketplace. 2' As a practical
matter, these factors can be broken down into two types of considera-
tions, both of which have played key roles in rule of reason analyses.
First is the motive behind the challenged agreement or act. Second is the
scope of the employed mechanism. For example, if a defendant can show
that its motive for entering into the challenged activity was predicated
on a desire to achieve some socially beneficial outcome, and that the
means employed are only those which are necessary, then the likelihood
is much greater that the defendant will prevail under a rule of reason
analysis. 2
2
The definition of a "beneficial outcome" is in itself a balancing act.
It must therefore be kept in mind that even if the motive and scope are
proper, if the challenged practice will produce a clearly egregious result,
an antitrust violation will most likely be found.
The manner in which a court will evaluate a given joint venture
under a rule of reason analysis is far from predictable. However, pre-
ventive measures can be taken. Prior to entering into a joint venture
agreement, the parties should give adequate consideration to the scope
of the agreement and their motives in forming the joint venture. This
practice should place the venture in the best possible light if it is ever
faced with antitrust charges. Therefore, in order to characterize the re-
quired level of social benefit and the nature of unreasonably excessive
means, it is necessary to take a closer look at the rationale used by the
courts.
14. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
15. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-93.
16. See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 447.
17. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 117.
18. See id. at 107.
19. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985).
20. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 119.
21. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1978).
22. It is persuasively argued that in the absence of demonstrated market power, a
joint venture would not be capable of yielding anticompetitive effects sufficient to violate
antitrust laws. While never specifically applied as such by the Supreme Court, there is a
growing body of circuit court authority which would add a market power threshold issue to
this two-part analysis. For a thorough analysis of this issue, seeJorde & Teece, Innovation,
Cooperation and Antitrst, 4 HIGH TECH. LJ. 1, 41- 46 (1989).
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A. Motive and Scope in Supreme Court Analyses
In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 23 the Court was asked to
consider whether a joint venture agreement between two chemical com-
panies violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 4 At issue was the
probability of whether the joint venture would result in a substantial les-
sening of competition. The Court recognized the commercial realities
of the 1940s and 1950s which led to the growth of joint ventures as
viable business entities.
[The] economic significance [of joint ventures] has grown tre-
mendously in the last score years, having been spurred on by
the need for speed and size in fashioning a war machine during
the early forties. Postwar use of ... joint projects led to the
spawning of thousands of such ventures in an effort to perform
the commercial tasks confronting an expanding economy. 25
The Court cautioned, however, that "It]he joint venture, like the
'merger and the conglomeration,' often creates anticompetitive dan-
gers." 26 Finding no proof of "[s]pecific intent to use Penn-Olin as a
vehicle to eliminate competition,"'27 the Court remanded the case to the
trial court for an assessment of the possibility of a substantial lessening
of competition.
The Court's allusion in Penn-Olin to the importance of motive in
rule of reason analysis became more significant fourteen years later in
the next major Court statement addressing the issue. In National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States,28 the Court's analysis of motive
demonstrated that even seemingly legitimate business incentives may
not avoid antitrust liability if the incentive could also be reasonably in-
terpreted as being anticompetitive by design. At issue was a canon of
ethics promulgated by the National Society of Professional Engineers
(NSPE). The canon required, in part, that "[t]he Engineer will not com-
pete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain employment
23. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
25. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 169.
26. Id.
27. The Court suggested the following criteria for a trial court to use when assessing
the probability of a substantial lessening of competition:
[Tihe number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the back-
ground of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the relationship of their
lines of commerce; the competition existing between them and the power of each
in dealing with the competitors of the other; the setting in which the joint venture
was created; the reasons and necessities for its ecistence; the joint venture's line of com-
merce and the relationship thereof or that of its parents; the adaptability of its
line of commerce to noncompetitive practices; the potential power of the joint
venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in the rele-
vant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone
instead of through Penn-Olin; the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the
other joint venturer's potential competition; and such other factors as might indi-
cate potential risk to competition in the relevant market.
Id. at 177 (emphasis added). On remand, the trial court dismissed the complaint without
reaching an analysis of whether the joint venture might result in a lessening of competi-
tion. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
28. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
1991]
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or advancement or professional engagements by competitive bidding
. . ,,29 The purpose of the canon was to encourage competition be-
tween engineering firms solely on the basis of technical qualifications,
thereby providing the public with the highest possible quality of serv-
ices. According to the NSPE, the quality of engineering services would
inevitably suffer as a result of attempting to achieve the lowest possible
price. Because many of these services had a direct impact on public
health, safety and welfare, the cost savings would be offset by the possi-
bility of devastating results.
3 0
In its majority opinion, the Court strayed from a consideration of
the legitimacy of the canon. Instead, the Court focused on the increased
burden placed on the purchaser who wishes to make price compari-
sons.3 ' The Court characterized the NSPE canon as "an absolute ban
on competitive bidding" 32 and as "doing away with competition" 33 de-
spite the retention of some price-based competition 3 4 and the availabil-
ity of quality-based competition. Even though the NSPE advanced an
ostensibly legitimate claim of interest in public safety, the Court found
that the NSPE canon had the intended purpose of maintaining price
levels .35
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, offered a scope-based rationale
for finding a Sherman Act violation, suggesting that the NSPE's rule was
"grossly overbroad." 3 6 Perhaps recognizing the Court's limited ability
to evaluate the commercial realities of practicing a given profession, he
warned that "there may be ethical rules which have a more than de
minimis anticompetitive effect and yet are important in a profession's
proper ordering."
3 7
A challenged agreement involving intellectual property came before
29. Id. at 683 n.3 (quoting section I 1 of the Society's Code of Ethics, adopted in July,
1964).
30. Id. at 685. The author, having worked for many years as an international engi-
neering consultant, has had first-hand experience with the legitimate value of such a ca-
non. It is not uncommon for purchasers of engineering services to base decisions solely
on price. Many engineering services possess inherent public safety aspects. Therefore, a
decision based solely on cost could result in serious adverse consequences. To avoid this,
many purchasers require decisions to be based on qualifications rather than cost. Purchas-
ers often require a two-part bidding process. The first decision, as to which firm will be
selected, is based on a comparison of the bidding firms' qualifications. Only after making
this choice does the purchaser open the cost proposal to determine whether it can afford
the selected firm. The Court was aware that even the federal government, as well as for-
eign governments, has used this method for selecting engineers. Id. at 694 nn.20-2 1.
31. Id. at 695.
32. Id. at 692.
33. Id. at 696.
34. Even under the canon's guidelines, the NSPE had to be aware that purchasers of
engineering services generally do a considerable amount of informal reputation-based
"price-shopping" prior to asking for bids. A firm's reputation for over-pricing services
would quickly lead to a lack of requests for bids. Nothing in the canon prevents a firm
from charging less for its services. It simply is prevented from making this information
available at the outset of the bidding process.
35. 435 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 699 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 700.
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the Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 3 8 To
facilitate the marketing of massive quantities of copyright-protected mu-
sic, two organizations, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), were formed.
BMI and ASCAP made the copyright music available to subscribers by
offering a "blanket license" whereby a subscriber paid for the right to
use all of the material controlled by that organization. Thus, an owner
of copyrighted music who joined one of these organizations could be
relieved of the impossible task of monitoring the widespread use of his
materials. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) complained that this
blanket license amounted to "illegal price fixing, an unlawful tying ar-
rangement, a concerted refusal to deal, and a misuse of copyrights."
39
The Court was concerned primarily with whether the arrangement
was aperse violation of the Sherman Act. However, in making this deter-
mination, it applied a sort of "mini-rule of reason" analysis to the facts.
The Court held that if the marketing arrangement is reasonably neces-
sary to protect the rights of individual owners under the copyright laws,
there is no violation of the Sherman Act.40 The Court remanded the
case to the Second Circuit, which found that because "the blanket li-
cense has no anti-competitive effect at all,"'4 ' there was no need to reach
the question of whether the arrangement was an unreasonable restraint
on trade.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have
avoided the remand by making its own rule of reason inquiry.4 2 Having
established that the practice had an anticompetitive effect,43 he sug-
gested that "[t]he current state of the market cannot be explained on the
ground that it could not operate competitively, or that issuance of more
limited-and thus less restrictive-licenses by ASCAP is not feasible."
4 4
Justice Stevens' suggestion that music-performing rights could be nego-
tiated on a different basis 45 reflects a concern others have expressed
about the use of less restrictive alternatives in a rule of reason analysis.
4 6
Specifically, there is almost always a possibility, especially in hindsight,
of creating an equally effective, less restrictive arrangement.
The fact that the ASCAP and BMI arrangements involved intellec-
tual property rights also was of concern to Justice Stevens. Recognizing
the fact that antitrust rule of reason analysis requires close scrutiny of
38. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 29-33.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id.
46. Jorde & Teece, supra note 22, at 48 ("The problem with this form of analysis is
that it can become a 'trump card' in the hands of lawyers and economists who argue that
the benefits of a cooperative arrangement could have been achieved with less restraint on
trade.").
1991]
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"great aggregations of economic power,"' 4 7 he noted that the privileges
conferred by patents and copyrights should be strictly limited to the
scope of the statutory grant.
48
Four years later, the Court again addressed the issue of motive and
scope in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma.49 This case involved an analysis of the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) plan for televising its members'
football games. The NCAA was concerned that the growth of television
coverage might reduce attendance at the live events. In order to elimi-
nate this problem, the NCAA implemented a plan which restricted the
total number of football games which could be televised, as well as the
number of games which an individual member team could agree to tele-
vise each year. Several of the teams filed for an injunction when the
NCAA tried to prevent them from forming a separate organization
within the NCAA for negotiating television contracts.
After determining that a rule of reason analysis was appropriate, the
Court stated that the anticompetitive behavior of the complaining teams
"place[d] upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the
operations of a free market."' 50 In attempting to establish this defense,
the NCAA put forth several justifications for its actions, including im-
proved marketing of broadcast rights,5 ' protecting live attendance, 52
and maintaining a competitive balance among teams.
53
The Court dealt with each of these claimed motives separately. It
first held that the record did not support the claimed procompetitive
marketing effects of the cooperative joint venture.5 4 Because the NCAA
had apparently inferred that procompetitive behavior naturally followed
from the formation of joint ventures, the Court was quick to point out
that "joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws ..... 55 It
went on to note, however, that "a joint selling arrangement may 'mak[e]
possible a new product by reaping otherwise unattainable
efficiencies.' "-56
The NCAA's second claim, that the plan was intended to protect
live attendance, was also met with a hostile response from the Court.
Although initially the plan probably was conceived to protect gate at-
tendance, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that the plan
had since "evolved in a manner inconsistent with its original design."' 57
47. Broadcast I1ustc, Inc., 441 U.S. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 115.
53. Id. at 117.
54. Id. at 115.
55. Id. at 113.
56. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 365
(1982)(Powell, J., dissenting)).
57. Id. at 116.
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A short excerpt from the opinion indicates that the Court had no inten-
tion of accepting this justification for the plan:
The NCAA's argument that its television plan is necessary to
protect live attendance is not based on a desire to maintain the
integrity of college football as a distinct and attractive product,
but rather on a fear that the product will not prove sufficiently
attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition
from televised games. At bottom, the NCAA's position is that
ticket sales for most college games are unable to compete in a
free market. The television plan protects ticket sales by limit-
ing output-just as any monopolist increases revenues by re-
ducing output.
58
The Court dealt with the NCAA's final argument, that the plan
would help maintain a competitive balance among the teams, by finding
that the rule was too broad. Although noting that some cooperation is
necessary to preserve the competitive nature of college sports, the Court
found that restraints on football telecasts simply did not "fit into the
same mold. '" 5 9 In fact, it was clear that other regulations promulgated
by the NCAA were not only more effective in achieving the desired goal,
they were also "clearly sufficient."
'60
The issue of improper motive was central to finding a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists.6 1 In this case, the Indiana Federation of Dentists (Federa-
tion) had initiated a policy whereby members were asked to refuse to
provide insurance companies with copies of patients' dental X-rays. In-
surance companies had been using these records to verify the necessity
of the dental services which were being provided.
The Federation claimed that the motivation behind instituting this
policy was that "the provision of X-rays might lead the insurers to make
inaccurate determinations of the proper level of care and thus injure the
health of the insured patients .... ,"62 The FTC, however, had provided
the Court with the text of a presentation made to dentists by a founder
of the Federation. Excerpts revealed that the true "motives underlying
the dentists' resistance to the provision of X-rays for use by insurers"
63
were of a less honorable and more pecuniary nature.
64
Obviously, a court's analysis6 5 of the commercial justification of any
58. Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 119.
61. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 450 n.1.
64. Included in the presentation were statements such as "We are fighting an eco-
nomic war where the very survival of our profession is at stake" and "The name of the
game is money. The government and labor are determined to reduce the cost of the den-
tal health dollar at the expense of the dentist." Id.
65. The lower courts have generally adhered to the decision-making procedures of
the Supreme Court. Motive and scope considerations are perhaps even more prevalent in
these courts, where it is often easier to determine the legitimacy and necessity of claimed
justifications. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951, 965
1991]
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proffered motives is colored by a certain amount of bias with respect to
what it believes is really taking place.6 6 Because all contracts have some
anticompetitive characteristics 6 7 they contain within themselves the nec-
essary ammunition to refute an argument for procompetitive character-
istics. The Court used this ammunition in Indiana Federation of Dentists.
Once it established the lack of a legitimate motive, the Court continued
through a full-blown rule of reason analysis, easily finding fault with any
claimed justifications for the policy.
III. SOCIAL, COMMERCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOINT VENTURES
The commercial realities faced by companies developing intellec-
tual property raise considerations which have yet to be addressed by the
courts using rule of reason analyses. The relative freedom and flexibil-
ity of the small entrepreneur provides an effective environment for the
conception of innovative technology. The costs and infrastructure re-
quired to bring this technology to the marketplace, however, demand
the resources of large multinational corporations. 6 8 In addition to look-
ing to small entrepreneurs for innovative ideas, large corporations may
also need to look to each other for the cross-pollination necessary to
successfully develop and commercialize intellectual property.
The literature is replete with discussions of the social and commer-
cial justifications for forming joint ventures regarding the development
and commercialization of intellectual property. 69 Although the motives
(10th Cir. 1990) ("[D]efendant's conduct was undertaken with the intent and effect of
preventing providers from contracting with other insurance companies. At issue in this
case is not a pristine 'agreement ......."(quoting Reazin v. Blue Cross, 663 F. Supp. 1360,
1412 (D. Kan. 1987))); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Getting needed information to the market is a fine goal, but the district court found that
the AMA was not motivated solely by altruistic concerns. Indeed, the court found that the
AMA intended to 'destroy a competitor'.... ); Goodman v. Acme Markets, Inc., Civil
Action No. 88-6447 (E. D. Pa. April 21, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4260) ("These are
reasonable limitations calculated to insure the competitiveness of Acme's store."); Verson
Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prod. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("A court must first
determine... the legitimate reasons behind the restraint [in order] to survive the rule of
reason.").
66. A legitimate motive will not necessarily preclude a finding of illegality, but it
should put the defendant's case in the best possible light. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, the Court explained that "a good intention will [not] save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but.., knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret the facts and to predict consequences." 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
67. See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (recogniz-
ing that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited by the Sherman Act); National
Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) ("restraint is the very
essence of every contract"); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence.").
68. Porter & Fuller, supra note 2, at 331.
69. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 2; First, StructuralAntitrust Rules and International Compe-
tition: The Case of Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U.L. RE'. 1054 (1987); Grossman & Shapiro,
ResearchJoint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis, 2J.L. EcON. & ORG. 315 (1986);Jorde & Teece,
supra note 1; Rill, Antitrust and International Corpetitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTITRUST LJ.
583 (1989); Weston & Ornstein, Efficiency Considerations in Joint Ventures, 53 ANTITRUST LJ.
85 (1984); see generally R. HALL, THE INTERNATIONALJOINT VENTURE (1984).
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behind the formation of these joint ventures are usually legitimate, the
structure of the arrangement can result in unexpected social costs which
in turn can lead to increased antitrust exposure. When examining how a
court might perceive the motives behind a joint venture, or the scope
necessitated by the commercial realities of the market, potential ventur-
ers need to consider a wide range of factors, including procompetitive
benefits and anticompetitive social harms.
Among the most commonly cited procompetitive justifications for
forming joint ventures are: the resulting integrative efficiencies, shared
risk, greater access to capital, use of complementary technology or re-
search techniques, overcoming entry barriers to domestic or interna-
tional markets, acquiring new managerial capabilities, and reduction of
waste resulting from duplicated research. 70 Balanced against these are
potential social costs which include the shaping of competition, 7T the
possibility of diminished actual or potential competition in the relevant
market, collusion, and the elimination of a "patent race" among rivals
resulting in reduced innovative activity (rather than merely eliminating
waste) .72
A company's decision of whether to enter into a joint venture will
be greatly impacted by the type of venture which will be formed. Cur-
rently, the law guarantees rule of reason analysis only for research and
development joint ventures. 7 3 Thus, the decision whether to limit the
joint venture to research and development, or to extend it to also in-
clude production, can lead to significantly different antitrust considera-
tions. The legislation which guaranteed rule of reason analysis for
research and development joint ventures was adopted in 1984 when
Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA).
74
The NCRA was designed to protect research and development joint
ventures from the full force of the antitrust laws by guaranteeing rule of
reason analysis. It is relatively easy for a joint venture to qualify under
the NCRA. Within ninety days of entering into a written agreement to
form such a joint venture, any party to that joint venture needs only to
file a brief notification with the Department ofJustice. This notice, pub-
lished in the Federal Register, must disclose the parties to the joint ven-
ture agreement and state the nature and objectives of the joint
venture.
7 5
70. See AbbottJoint Production Ventures: The Case for Antitrust Reform, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
715, 716-19 (1989) (supporting shared risk and duplicated research waste); Porter &
Fuller, supra note 68, at 322-327 (supporting shared risk, greater access to capital, use of
complementary technology, and overcoming entry barriers); S. Radtke & A. Ponikvar, Co-
OPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 12-13 (American Mgt. Assoc. Management Brief-
ing 1984); Weston & Ornstein, supra note 69, at 85 (supports overcoming entry barriers,
and acquiring new managerial capabilities).
71. Porter & Fuller, supra note 2, at 325 ("coalitions can influence who a firm com-
petes with and the basis of competition.") This has been framed in terms of facilitating
collusion.
72. Abbott, supra note 70, at 719-22.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
74. Id.
75. See id. § 4305.
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By virtue of filing this notice, the joint venture is assured of a rule of
reason analysis in any future antitrust action.76 Additionally, if antitrust
liability is ever found, the joint venture's damages will be limited to ac-
tual damages, without the possibility of treble damages, which are nor-
mally awarded in antitrust cases. 77 Under the NCRA, however, it is still
possible for the joint venture to be held liable for attorneys' fees and
costs. By showing that a claim was frivolous or without foundation,
though, a prevailing defendant may be able to recover its attorneys' fees
and costs.
78
Even though qualification under the NCRA is quite simple, in the
six years between the passage of the NCRA and 1990, only an estimated
150joint ventures were formed.7 9 Ostensibly because of the limited na-
ture of the NCRA, the filings have been primarily for joint ventures
which have relatively minor competitive importance.8 0 This low number
of filings suggests that research and development joint ventures struc-
tured for more commercially important efforts are willing to forego the
potential protection of the NCRA in exchange for the maintenance of
greater secrecy. It may also be that in some cases, joint venturers per-
ceive no advantage to being guaranteed a rule of reason analysis.
Under the current form of the NCRA, this protection is only af-
forded to research and production joint ventures. The NCRA's rule of
reason guarantee does not apply to joint ventures involved in the manu-
facturing, marketing or sales of the fruits of this technology. 8 ' Thomas
M. Jorde and David J. Teece provide a compelling argument for ex-
tending the protection of the NCRA to include within its scope these
other types ofjoint ventures. 8 2 Jorde and Teece base their argument on
the premise that innovation is a simultaneous process, requiring con-
stant feedback between the laboratory and the field. At the same time,
successful commercialization of technology requires several cycles of
testing a product in the marketplace and then returning to the lab for
incremental improvements. Therefore, it does not appear reasonable to
grant reduced antitrust exposure to part of this process, but not to the
remainder. Under a rule of reason analysis, the need for this "simulta-
neous view of innovation" 8 3 provides a strong argument for the legiti-
macy of the motive and the necessity of the scope of a joint venture
involved in downstream activities.
76. See id. § 4302.
77. See id. § 4303(a).
78. See id. § 4304.
79. See 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed. Jun. 5, 1990) (comments of Rep. Brooks).
80. Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 547 n.56.
81. Production and marketing of the intellectual property itself is allowed, however.
15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2) ("the term 'joint research and development venture' excludes [ac-
tivities involvingjoint production or marketing] other than the production or marketing of
proprietary information developed through such venture, such as patents and trade
secrets ....").
82. Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 534-36 (more fully described in Teece, Interora-
ganizatonal Requirements of the Innovation Process, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 35
(1989)).
83. Id. at 534.
[Vol. 68:2
RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
This is not to say forward progress has not been made. There is
proposed joint production venture legislation in H.R. 4611,84 which
takes the next step by including production operations in rule of reason
analysis. While this legislation still excludes marketing, distribution and
sales ventures8 5 from rule of reason protection, it does set forth addi-
tional qualifications which reflect the growing concern about American
companies' ability to compete in the international arena. For example, a
production joint venture registering under this program can have no
more than thirty percent of its ownership controlled by foreign enti-
ties.8 6 Furthermore, H.R. 4611 also requires the joint venture to locate
all facilities within the United States.8 7 Finally, in a limited move toward
clarifying rule of reason standards, this legislation specifies that "[f]or
the purpose of determining a properly defined, relevant market, the
worldwide capacity of suppliers to provide a product, process, or service
shall be considered to the extent appropriate in the circumstances." 88
If some version of H.R. 4611 becomes law, lobbying for further
modifications to the NCRA is likely. Already, commentators have sug-
gested improvements beyond a mere extension of rule of reason analysis
to production. Suggestions have included elimination of the award of
attorneys' fees,8 9 clarification of the standards by which a rule of reason
analysis will be applied, 90 creation of a "safe harbor" for smaller compa-
nies, 9 1 and reduction (or elimination) of damages as a remedy.
9 2
Finally, consideration must be given to the fact that there are really
two levels of antitrust concerns faced by companies contemplating the
formation of a joint venture to develop intellectual property. The first
concern is that which we have been discussing-cooperative arrange-
ments between competitors. The second concern is the manner in
which such a joint venture might use the intellectual property it has de-
84. H.R. 4611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990)
(statement of Mr. Brooks).
85. See supra note 9.
86. 136 CONG. REC. H3099, H3100 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990) (reference to modification
in § 7(a) of the NCRA).
87. Id. Note that at H3099 (Sec. 3 Application of Amendments), a clarification was
added so as not to interfere with the Free-Trade Agreement Between the United States
and Canada.
88. Id. at H3 100 (reference to modification in § 3 of the NCRA).
89. Abbott, supra note 70, at 732.
90. Id. The author suggests that these standards follow the guidelines in U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 15-19 (1988) so that "[I]ntellectual property licensing restrictions will not be
deemed illegal unless: (1) such restrictions facilitate collusion in markets not embodying
the intellectual property; or (2) such restrictions go beyond the appropriation of returns
on the intellectual property." Abbott, supra note 70, at 732 n.45. See also W. HOLMES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAw (Release No. 6, Sept., 1986) at 13-6.
91. SeeJorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 550 (suggesting no antitrust liability for joint
ventures involving less than twenty-five percent of the relevant market). But see Abbott,
supra note 70, at 731-32 (arguing that a market share specific safe harbor would result in
arbitrary line drawing).
92. See, e.g.,Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 550. A version of this suggestion has been
incorporated in the proposed National Cooperative Innovation and Commercialization
Act of 1989, H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E425 (daily ed. Feb. 21,
1989) (remarks of Mr. Boucher).
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veloped. Analysis of the antitrust concerns for each will necessarily be
separate, so it is imperative to give both areas sufficient consideration as
to the underlying motive for, and the resulting scope of, the
arrangement.
Concerns about the use of intellectual property by a joint venture
go to the previously mentioned "nine no-no's" of patent licensing.
9 3
These are licensing acts which the Department of Justice considers ille-
gal per se. Fortunately, courts generally recognize the possibility that
there may also be procompetitive benefits for most intellectual property
antitrust concerns.9 4 Thus, courts will apply rule of reason analyses in
situations where procompetitive characteristics are present. Although
courts vary in the level of scrutiny and the specifics of the tests they
use,9 5 the motive and scope considerations will generally be the same.
With respect to the intellectual property itself, the balancing tests
are developing favorably toward commercially reasonable cooperative
uses. This is as a result of the general trend toward strengthening intel-
lectual property rights for American companies. While the courts have
made steady progress in this direction, Congress has also climbed on
the bandwagon. Since 1983 Congress has passed more than a dozen
laws in support of intellectual property.96 Even though this may not
make intellectual property "the 'darling' of Congress," 9 7 it does show
that Congress is prepared to take the steps necessary to enable Ameri-
can companies to protect effectively these important rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is widespread agreement that current rule of reason analyses
by the courts are unpredictable. 98 This is especially true in the case of
intellectual property joint ventures. To believe otherwise would be to
take a naive and unnecessary risk. Because even if the government is
satisfied that a joint venture poses no antitrust violations, there is still
the threat of a private suit.9 9 As a result of a private suit, a venture's fate
93. Supra note 4.
94. See, e.g.,Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S. 2 (1984) (reaffirming
the rule of reason standards for patent tying established in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) (territorial restrictions); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,
329 U.S. 637 (1947) (grant-backs); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d
673 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring proof beyond mere copyright ownership to establish the
existence of market power); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (court looks at limited scope of grant-back).
95. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (exclusive dealing,
tie-outs); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 137-38 (1969)
(package Licensing); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (pat-
ent pooling); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (price-fixing).
96. The Battle Raging Over 'Intellectual Property,' Bus. WK., May 22, 1989, at 78.
97. Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and International Conipeittiveness, 58
ANTrrRUST L.J. 569, 574 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Jorde & Teece, supra note 22 at 40 & n.100 (1989).
99. The Department of Justice, in its publications. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988) and ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RE-
SEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980), has made it clear that it intends to apply rule of reason
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could be decided by ajudge who has been forced to assume the role of a
businessman for the purpose of evaluating commercial reasonableness.
While Congress is moving to better define rule of reason, there remains
much progress to be made.
Until rule of reason standards are codified, joint venturers will have
to rely on the analyses of the courts, which are marginally restricted at
best. Potential joint venturers would be wise, therefore, to pay close
attention to the motive and scope factors when structuring their agree-
ments, as these clearly play an important practical role in judicial deci-
sions. Consider the words of Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 100 in which he considers how to deter-
mine whether a contract between two parties unreasonably restrains
competition:
[T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to
which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary ....
The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of pro-
tection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by
which the validity of such restraints may be judicially deter-
mined .... [I]f the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by
the main purpose of the contract, it is void .... In such a case
[where the sole object is to restrain competition] there is no
measure of what is necessary to the protection of either party,
except the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how
much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be al-
lowed to restrain competition.' 0 '
Perhaps not so much has changed in the last one hundred years.
James Ball
standards to joint ventures (other than those obviously a sham) before even deciding to
file suit. Private party plaintiffs might not be so understanding, however. A private party
could be any individual, corporation, or state Attorney General as parens patnae on behalf
of citizens. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C.),
596 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1984). In the early 1980s, General Motors and Toyota entered
into discussions concerning a joint venture to produce certain small cars in the United
States. Prior to the time the joint venture obtained a final consent decree, but following
conditional approval by the FTC, Chrysler filed a private action attempting to enjoin the
joint venture. After about a year and a half, the case was settled. Weinbaum, Production
Joint Ventures: The GM-Toyota Experience, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 709, 711 (1989). But see Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (standing denied where court finds
private plaintiff (competitor) might be helped, not damaged, by challenged merger); Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchaser barred from suit).
100. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
101. Id. at 282-83.
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